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JUDICIAL POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM
WE THE PEOPLE, VOLUME 3: THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION. By Bruce Ackerman. 1 Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 2014. 432 pp. Hardcover, $35.00.
Tom Donnelly 2
INTRODUCTION
Bruce Ackerman's We the People: The Civil Rights
Revolution- the third book in what will eventually become a We
the People quartet-is a staggering achievement. In one sense, it's
simply a continuation of a story that he began telling decades ago,
one that valorizes popular sovereignty and the ongoing
constitutional creativity of the American people. 1 Although not
generally labeled a popular constitutionalist, Ackerman was an
important forerunner of the movement, urging scholars to look
outside both the courts and the formal constraints of Article V to
find the real story of constitutional change in the United States. 4
In the end, both Ackerman and his popular constitutionalist
counterparts agree on the one big thing that matters most: the
American people are (and ought to be) the ultimate drivers of
constitutional change.
In his new volume, Ackerman blesses another key era in
American history as a period of higher lawmaking and explains,
in something like common law fashion (p. 81 ), how the Civil
Rights Revolution both fits with and builds upon the lessons and

I. Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School.
2. The author is a lawyer in Washington, D.C. J.D., Yale Law School, 2009; B.A.,
Georgetown University, 2003. For their suggestions and encouragement, I extend my deep
thanks to Bruce Ackerman, Michael Klarman, and the participants in Harvard Law
School's Climenko Fellows workshop. The views expressed in this Book Review arc my
own.
3. See ] BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) !hereinafter
ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS!; Bruce A. Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE
L.J. 1031 (19X4).
4. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 3, at 59.
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achievements of the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal
(p. 5). (Spoiler alert: The Civil Rights Revolution is a
constitutional moment!) Of course, the pattern of higher
lawmaking isn't precisely the same and new legal resources -like
landmark statutes-receive greater emphasis (p. 5), but much of
the terminology is familiar to those who have spent time with
Ackerman's previous volumes, as is this volume's overall
normative thrust.
Taken at this level, The Civil Rights Revolution surely
achieves much of what Ackerman sets out to accomplish,
providing an illuminating, textured, and (at timleS) revisionist
account of this key period of American history- an account that
stands up quite well to his treatment of other constitutional
moments in previous volumes. Notably, it's also a delight to read.
In other words, it's pure Ackerman.
It should come as little surprise, then, that critics have already
lodged a familiar set of complaints against this new volumemany of which have been recycled after the publication of each
part of the We the People series. Some critics take dead aim at
Ackerman's ml!ltistep process f~r ident~fying ge?uine acts of
popular soveretgnty.· Others ~uibble with certain aspects of
Ackerman's historical narrative.' I leave those wel1-worn paths to
others. Instead, in this Book Review, I focus on the relationship
between Ackerman's new volume and the theory of popular
constitutionalism.
The most enduring criticism of popular constitutionalism is
that the literature offers few clues about how to make it work,
7
especially as an approach to judicial decisionmaking. While some
scholars have sought to respond to these criticism:s,x a great deal
5. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, We the People: f-'ach and Every One, 123 YALE LJ.
2576 (2014); David A. Strauss, The Nco-Hamiltonian Temptation, 123 YALE. L.J. 2676
(2014).
6. See, e.g., Lani Guinicr & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a
Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE LJ. 2740 (2014).
7. See Tahatha Ahu EI-Haj, Linking the Questions: Judicial Supremacy as a Matter
of Constitutional Interpretation, KlJ W /\SJ-1. U. L REV. 130<}, 1316 (2012); Michael Scrota,
Popular Constitutional Interpretation, 44 CONN. L REV. 1635, 1646 (2012); Larry
Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 11K HARV. L REV. 15lJ4,
1602 (2005) (reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITL!TION/\LISM /\NO JLJDICI/\L REVIEW (2004)).
K See Katie Eyer, Lower Court Popular Constitutionalism, 12:?1 YALE LJ. ONLINE
1Y7 (2013); Mark D. Rosen & Christopher W. Schmidt, Why Broccoli? Limiting Principles
and Popular Constitutionalism in the Health Care Case, 61 UCLA L REV. 66 (2013); Brad
Snyder, Frankfurter and Popular Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343 (2013);
Tom Donnelly, Making Popular Constitutionalism Work, 2012 WIS. L REV. 15<}
!hereinafter Donnelly. WorkJ.
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of work remains to be done. To that end, popular
constitutionalists should pay close attention to the parts of
Ackerman's new volume devoted to constitutional interpretation.
While previous volumes have provided glimpses of how
Ackerman's approach might work, The Civil Rights Revolution
provides even fuller treatment of this issue. In short, Ackerman's
new volume should serve as the starting point for any robust
account of (what I refer to as) judicial popular constitutionalism.
In this Book Review, I seek to offer an approach to popular
constitutional analysis that keeps faith with Larry Kramer's
groundbreaking scholarship, while also remaining as consistent as
possible with the role that public opinion already plays in judicial
decisionmaking. My goal here isn't to argue that judicial popular
constitutionalism is the best approach to constitutional analysis.
Instead, I simply wish to explore whether a coherent approach is
even possible, and, if so, to begin to sketch what it might look like.
This Book Review proceeds in three Parts. Part I provides a
general overview of Ackerman's new volume, situating it within
the framework of his entire We the People series. Part II uses
Ackerman's insights about constitutional interpretation to sketch
a preliminary account of judicial popular constitutionalism. Part
III uses the issue of marriage equality to demonstrate how judicial
popular constitutionalism might work.
I. ACKERMAN'S THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION

Bruce Ackerman's big idea is that popular sovereignty is
(and ought to be) the driver of constitutional change within our
system. The main challenge for constitutional theorists and, more
importantly, for judges, is to identify when the American people
have spoken (p. 32-47). For Ackerman, the answer lies in "a
9
reflective study of the past. "
In Ackerman's view, American history teaches a simple, but
profound lesson. When the American people speak, our tradition
permits them to shatter conventional legal barriers and change
our constitutional baselines- whether by establishing a new
constitution (e.g., the Founding), re-founding our republic
through transformative amendments (e.g., Reconstruction), or
reshaping foundational ideas without altering the words of the

9.

ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS,

supra note 3, at 17.
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Constitution (e.g., the New Deal) (p. 3). For Ackerman, this is the
very core of the American constitutional tradition .
To promote legitimate constitutional change, each
constitutional proposal must traverse a multistep, multiyear
process, which includes a series of public debates, political fights,
elections, and court battles (pp. 44-47). However, if the new
proposal survives this process- if its adherents win a series of
political victories, if its opponents acquiesce, and if the judiciary
codifies the new constitutional understanding in transformative
decisions- the proposal earns the right to alter our constitutional
order (p. 42). This is what Ackerman means by his famous label,
"constitutional moment" (p. 43-47). It's not really a moment at
all, but a series of tests that a new set of constitutional
revolutionaries must pass in order to earn the right to speak for
the American people (p. 51).
Ackerman introduces and develops these ideas in two
previous volumes, We the People: Foundations and We the People:
Transformations. 10 In his new volume- We the People: The Civil
Rights Revolution-Ackerman puts the achievements of the Civil
Rights Era to the test.
A. ACKERMAN'S CIVIL RIGHTS STORY

Ackerman's civil rights story begins with Brown v. Board of
Education. In his account, this landmark decision defines a new
constitutional baseline- the "anti-humiliation principle"- and
signals the beginning of a new period of sustained constitutional
debate over the meaning of equality (pp. 128-129, 137-143, 307310). In this sense, the Civil Rights Revolution differs from
Ackerman's three previous constitutional moments-the
Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal-all of which were
initiated, not by the judiciary, but by political leaders of varying
stripes (p. 5). Nevertheless, constitutional leadership during the
Civil Rights Revolution soon passes from the Warren Court to the
elected branches-and, ultimately, to the American people.
With the Brown decision and the rise of the civil rights
movement, the American people soon awake from their civic
slumber. Suddenly, neither the President nor Congress can safely
ignore the legacy of Jim Crow and the civil rights movement's
push for a new vision of equality. Instead, all three branches work
10. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (199X)
!hereinafter ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS!; ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note
3.
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together to extend Brown's anti-humiliation principle from public
education to other spheres like voting and housing, endorsing a
vision of equality that differs greatly from the one that the
American people inherited from Reconstruction (pp. 222-223).
Ackerman's post-Brown narrative begins with President
Johnson and Congress. Johnson works with congressional leaders
to push through the Civil Rights Act of 1964, blowing past the
limits set by the state-action doctrine and requiring an end to
private discrimination in the workplace and in various public
settings like hotels, restaurants, and theaters (pp. 175-176, 223).
Johnson then wins a landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, an
election that engages the American public and provides them with
a clear choice on the issue of civil rights (pp. 6, 41, 72-X4). And,
finally, Johnson puts his broad electoral mandate to the test,
working with Congress to pass additional landmark statutesincluding the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Fair Housing Act
of 1968-statutes that codify the new constitutional
understanding of equality endorsed by the American people (pp.
5, 92-95, 120-121, 200-210).
From there, the Warren Court translates this new
constitutional understanding into doctrine through a series of
transformative opinions. While supporters of the old
constitutional regime rely upon well-established case law to
challenge the new landmark statutes in court, Chief Justice
Warren and his colleagues turn aside each of these challenges. In
the process, the Warren Court joins the civil rights movement and
its supporters in recognizing an increased role for the federal
government in securing equality (pp. 13, 121, 313-315).
Finally, Ackerman's civil rights narrative ends with the most
unlikely of heroes, Richard Nixon. For Ackerman, Nixon plays a
key role in consolidating the gains made by President Johnson, his
congressional allies, and the Warren Court. During the 1968
election, Nixon largely embraces the emerging bipartisan
consensus on civil rights. Furthermore, as president, he signs new
laws and supports new administrative actions that both
supplement and strengthen the Civil Rights Era's landmark
11
statutes (pp. 6, 241-252). According to Ackerman, by supporting
the core of the "New Deal-Civil Rights regime," Nixon gives "it a
bipartisan basis that place[s] its legitimacy beyond serious

11. Ackerman calls such administrative action "government hy numhcrs," a form of
administrative constitutionalism (pp. 155, 199).
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question"- the final step on the path from mere constitutional
proposal to fully realized constitutional moment (p. 6).
B. HEEDING THE CALL OF "WE THE PEOPLE": A.CKERMAN'S
APPROACH TO CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

In this Book Review, I'm interested in exploring the lessons
that Ackermanian constitutional interpretation holds for popular
constitutionalists. To that end, I attempt in this Section to
deconstruct
Ackerman's
approach
to
constitutional
interpretation, disaggregating it into its component steps. While
Ackerman doesn't present his account in quite this way- indeed,
we must await his next volume, We the People: Interpretations, for
his full-blown theory of constitutional interpretation (p. 336)- I
believe that the description thar follows generally tracks with
what he's written about constitutional interpretation so far and is
faithful to the overall normative thrust of his We the People series.
From the perspective of popular constitutionalism,
Ackerman gets the big things right. Constitutional change ought
to be driven by the American people. Courts ought to be bound
by genuine acts of popular sovereignty even if they don't satisfy
Article V. Judicial review ought to, at its core, promote the
considered judgments of the American people. Furthermore,
some of the details of his approach also offer concrete clues for
how judicial popular constitutionalism might work.
Within Ackerman's system, the constitutional interpreter
must first identify when the American people have spoken (p.
337). Indeed, the very core of Ackerman's approach to
constitutional interpretation is concerned with distinguishing
between genuine acts of popular sovereignty-when "We the
People" have spoken- and normal acts of everyday politics. The
former are infused with constitutional importance, the latter not
so much. This is where Ackerman's famous theory of
constitutional moments comes in. To serve as a catalyst for
legitimate constitutional change, a given movement and its
proposal must run Ackerman's gauntlet (the multistep, multiyear
process discussed in Part I, supra) and secure the American
people's "broad" and "sustained" support (p. 224). However,
even when a proposal has survived this process and the interpreter
has gone on to identify it as a genuine act of popular sovereignty,
that's only the beginning of Ackerman's process of constitutional
interpretation.
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Second, the constitutional interpreter must determine how
the American people have spoken. To decide constitutional cases,
judges traditionally draw upon some mix of constitutional text,
history, structure, doctrine, and (at times) prudential concerns. 12
Ackerman urges the constitutional interpreter to privilege
whichever constitutional materials best capture the commitments
made by the American people- whether that's a piece of
constitutional text, a transformative Supreme Court decision, a
landmark statute, or an important political speech (pp. 28-33,
317). These materials are what Ackerman has in mind when he
talks about the "legal canon." For instance, to capture the
commitments of the Civil Rights Revolution, the faithful
interpreter must heed the words and deeds of Martin Luther
King, Jr., Lyndon Johnson, Hubert Humphrey, and Everett
Dirksen- not just those of the Warren Court and those endorsed
by the Article V amendment process (p. 7).
Third, the constitutional interpreter must determine what the
American people have actually said. The task here is to parse the
materials identified in the previous step and determine the key
constitutional principles endorsed by the American people. When
the faithful interpreter tends to these canonical sources, certain
foundational principles emerge- in the case of the Civil Rights
Revolution, principles like the "eradication of institutionalized
humiliation" and "equal treatment in public accommodations" (p.
224). These principles should serve as important reference points
when analyzing specific constitutional controversies-reference
points that may only be superseded by successful constitutional
revolutions (pp. 33, 225, 317).
Finally, the constitutional interpreter must seek to synthesize
the constitutional principles of the most recent revolution with
those of our constitutional past-preserving some old principles
and either altering or disposing of others (p. 336). Ackerman
refers to this interpretive task as intergenerational synthesis (p.
336). 13 For instance, the Civil Rights Revolution is only our most
recent constitutional moment, but the achievements of previous
generations remain. It is the lawyer's (and judge's) task to "fit"
any new principles endorsed by the American people into a
"larger pattern of constitutional development" (p. 1). Some new
principles (like ending discrimination by private businesses) will
12. See PHILIP BOBBI'TT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION
(19X2).
13. See also Bruce Ackerman, De-Schooling Constitutional Law, 123 YALE L.J. 3104,
3122 (2014) !hereinafter Ackerman, De-Schooling!.
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supersede old ones (like the state-action doctrine), while other
traditional understandings will remain unscathed (p. 336).
Importantly, Ackerman reserves a key role for lawyers and
judges-and their professional judgment-in working out these
problems on a case-by-case basis, as the principles endorsed by
different generations combine to address the constitutional
problems of today (p. 336).
In the end, Ackerman's account provides several clues for
how judicial popular constitutionalism might work.
II. POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY, CONSTITlJTIONAL
INTERPRETATION, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF
JUDICIAL POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
Since popular constitutionalism's inception, critics have
attacked it as an elusive concept-one lacking a precise definition
or a discernible core. 14 This is especially true in the context of
constitutional interpretation. 15 While some scholars have begun to
16
respond to these criticisms, there's little use in denying that these
critics have hit upon a serious problem. The question is whether
it's somehow fatal to the entire project. I think not.
As I have explained elsewhere, despite disagreements over
methodology, constitutional history, and specific prescriptions,
popular constitutionalists do share one key attribute, a populist
sensibility- a common belief that the American people should
play an ongoing role in shaping contemporary constitutional
meaning.' 7 Furthermore, with respect to constitutional
interpretation,
in
particular-an
area
that
popular
constitutionalists have largely neglected- Ackerman's new
volume offers several clues for how judicial popular
constitutionalism might work.
Of course, popular constitutionalism itself is often associated
with the anti-court attacks of its most famous proponentswhether in the form of diatribes against judicial supremacy, praise
14. See Scrota, supra note 7, at 1646; Keith Wcrhan, Popular Constitutionalism,
Ancient and Modern, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 65,67 (2012); Alexander & Solum, supra note
7, at 1602; Erwin Chcmcrinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: The Perils of Popular
Constitutionalism, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 673, 676.
15. See EI-Haj, supra note 7, at 1309, 1316; Scrota, supra note 7, at 1659; Richard
Primus, Public Consensus as Constitutional Authority, 7X GEO. WASil. L. REV. 1207, 1214
(2010); Suzanna Sherry, Putting the Law Back in Constitutional Law, 25 CONST.
COMMENT. 461,463 (2009); Alexander & Solum, supra note 7, at 1621-22.
16. See Eyer, supra note X; Rosen & Schmidt, supra note X; Snyder, supra note X;
Donnelly, Work, supra note X.
17. See Donnelly, Work, supra note X, at 161--62.
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for court-curbing measures like ~urisdiction-stripping, or calls to
end judicial review altogether. x Therefore, the very idea of
judicial popular constitutionalism may, at first, sound
oxymoronic.
Wasn't
the
whole
idea
of
popular
constitutionalism-at least as envisioned by Larry Kramer, its
Founding Father-to address the problem of judicial supremacy?
If so, shouldn't popular constitutionalists try to reduce the role of
judges in our constitutional system? Not necessarily.
To be sure, Kramer's account is rooted in an anti-court
attitude shaped by a certain reading of American history. 19
However, even as Kramer calls upon the American people and
their elected representatives to curb an elitist Supreme Court, he
still leaves a large role for judges within his system.
Stripped of its anti-court rhetoric and court-curbing
prescriptions, Kramer's account is fundamentally concerned with
promoting a system of deliberative democracy-one guided not
by "the fleeting passions . . . of the moment," but by the
20
considered views of the American people. Within this system,
each branch of government is tasked with "slow[ing] down" our
21
political process. In the case of constitutional disputes, in
particular, this is meant "to force the kind of public debate needed
22
for 'the reason of the society' to emerge. " And once that
"reason" emerges- once the American people reach a considered
judgment about a given constitutional issue- that judgment is
decisive.
Importantly, the judiciary remains a key part of this process,
empowered to enforce such judgments and, in turn, check
unconstitutional acts by the President, Congress, and the states.
However, Kramer offers few clues about how judges should go
about deciding individual cases. For those seeking to keep faith
with Kramer's groundbreaking account, perhaps the best clue lies
in his overall normative vision for our constitutional system, a
system where "questions of constitutional interpretation" are
23
"authoritatively settled only by 'the people"' and even the
Supreme Court "yield[s] to" their "judgments about what the
Snyder, supra note X, at 347.
LARRY
D. KRAMER, TilE PEOPU· THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 22l.l (2004).
20. Larry D. Kramer, "The Interest of the Man": James Madison, Popular
Constitutionalism, and the Theory of Deliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 61)7, 730

lK
ll.l.

(2006).
21.
22.
23.

See
See

/d. at 733.
at 736.

!d.

KRAMER,

supra

note

ll.l, at 31.
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24

Constitution means." It is precisely this vision that guides the
account of judicial popular constitutionalism that follows.
A. JUDICIAL POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AS

A RULE OF

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION

Both Ackermanian constitutional interpretation and judicial
popular constitutionalism begin with a shared prerr1ise. Whenever
the American people speak, judges should lis1ten. However,
whereas Ackerman limits periods of genuine popular sovereignty
to a few pivotal decades in American history -leaving it up to
judges to elaborate on their deeper meaning during long stretches
of constitutional silence-a popular constitutionalist may be open
to following the commands of the American people on a more
consistent basis. Sometimes these constitutional commands will
be profound, requiring genuine transformations like those
following from the New Deal and the Civil Rights Revolution.
Other times, they may lead to smaller-scale changes, like the
recognition of a new constitutional right or the disposal of an
outdated line of precedent. Either way, the Arr1erican people
remain
the
popular
constitutionalist's
lodestar- the
constitutional text that they ratify, the constitutional
revolutionaries that they endorse, and the new constitutional
understandings that they reach.
While the Constitution's text answers some of the popular
constitutionalist's questions (e.g., whether a 29-year-old may be
President), the text alone fails to resolve many others. This is
especially true of "abstract, general, and vague" pieces of text like
"due process of law" and "the privileges or immuniities of citizens
of the United States" -indeed, the very phrases and passages on
which the most important constitutional questions often turn. 25
As I envision it, judicial popular constitutionalism may be
understood as a rule of constitutional construction- one that the
committed popular constitutionalist may apply whenever the
Constitution's text is vague or irreducibly ambiguous. 2h Put
24.
25.

!d. at 247--4X.

Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 95, lOX (2010).
26. Here, I'm borrowing from the familiar distinction hetween interpretation and
construction advanced hy scholars like Lawrence Solum, Keith Whittington, Randy
Barnett, and Jack Balkin, among others. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING 0RIGINALISM
(2011 ); KEITH E. WHIITINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS
AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999); Lawrence l3. Solum, Incorporation and
Origina!ist Theory, IX J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 409 (2009); Lawrence B. Solum,
Originalism and Constitutional Construction, X2 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013); Solum,
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simply, when the semantic meaning of the Constitution's text is
clear, it ought to control even the committed popular
constitutionalist. However, when that meaning is unclear and the
American people have reached a considered judgment about how
best to give that text life, the popular constitutionalist should
grant considerable weight to that judgment as a default rule. 27
When I refer to the American people's "considered" views or
judgments, I mean something approaching a deep, durable,
sustained consensus on a given constitutional issue-one that's
the product of widespread public deliberation and, in turn, signals
a certain amount of individual-level reflection by the average
citizen.
While this general rule is simple enough to state, the practical
challenges of applying it are considerable. Public ignorance runs
2
high, x and public consensus is rare. 2 And even when such a
consensus is possible, how should we define it? Should we look to
polling data, the political rhetoric of our major parties, social
movement activism, the laws on the books, recent election
returns, or some other talismanic source? Should we require
evidence of super-majority support for a given position or a mere
30
majority? Should our approach differ for different constitutional
provisions,:" and when, if ever, should public consensus yield to an
<)

supra note 25; Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, X2 FORDHAM L.
REV. 375 (2013). As Solum explains, vagueness ''refers to the existence of borderline cases:
a term is vague if there are cases where the term might or might not apply"- for example,
the descriptor "tall." Solum, supra note 25, at tJX. Ambiguity refers to a situation in which
a word "has more than one sense." /d. at tJ7-tJX. For instance, "cool" can mean "low
temperature" or "hip or stylish." /d. at tJ7.
27. See Solum, supra note 25, at 104-05; Solum, supra note 26, at 43X; Whittington,
supra note 26, at 404.
2K See Alexander & Solum, supra note 7, at 1625; Serota, supra note 7, at 1656--5();
Ilya Somin & Sanford Levinson, Debate, Democracy, Political Ignorance, and
Constitutional Reform, 157 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 23tJ, 240-41 (200tJ), http://www
.pennlawreview.com/online/157-lJ-Pa-L-Rev-PENNumhra-23tJ.pdf; . But see Jamal
Greene, Nathaniel Persily & Stephen Ansolahehere, Profiling Originalism, 111 COLUM.
L. REV. 356,361 (2011) (concluding hased on empirical research that the American puhlic
may "have nontrivial levels of legal and political knowledge").
2tJ. See Richard L. Hasen, Political Dysfunction and Constitutional Change, 61
DRAKE L. REV. tJXtJ, tJtJ2-tJ3 (2013); Richard Primus, Double-Consciousness in
Constitutional Adjudication, 13 REV. CON ST. STUD. 1, X (2007) Ihereinafter Primus,
Double-Consciousness!; Primus, supra note 15, at 120tJ. When there is no puhlic consensus,
the popular constitutionalist may turn to other modalities of constitutional analysis, or she
may simply resort to judicial restraint as a secondary rule of constitutional construction,
one that might serve as the next hest proxy for the constitutional views of the American
people.
30. See Akhil Reed Amar, America's Lived Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. 1734, 1777X2 (2011 ).
31. There may he certain provisions that the committed popular constitutionalist
excludes from popular constitutional analysis. See David A. Strauss, The Modernizing
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individual interpreter's own sense of fairness and good social
policy? 32 And finally, are judges even competent to decipher the
public's constitutional views in the first place, or should we simply
call upon them to defer to the elected branches as the soundest
way of combating judicial supremacy and respecting popular
33
sovereignty?
These are vexing questions, and different popular
constitutionalists with different sensibilities may answer them
differently. For now, I'm not interested in adjudicating all of these
intramural disputes. Instead, my goal in this Book Review is to
build a useful framework for channeling ongoing disputes
between committed popular constitutionalists (and their critics)
over the feasibility, desirability, and administrability of judicial
popular constitutionalism-drawing upon Ackerman's account of
constitutional interpretation throughout as a useful guide and foil.
Before I begin to develop this account, a couple of caveats.
First, I recognize that judicial popular constitutionalism is in
tension with traditional conceptions of judicial review as a
safeguard against majoritarian tyranny. As a result, there may be
certain constitutional provisions worth excluding from popular
constitutional analysis-in particular, minority-protective
provisions like the First Amendment. Second, the committed
popular constitutionalist must remain sensitive to the danger of
false positives-perhaps because key indicators of public opinion
are merely the product of either an inattentive public or the
actions of elected officials without a genuine popular mandate. 34
Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. H5Y, Y01 (200Y) (providing the First
Amendment as an example). Furthermore, there may he certain provisions that arc more
populist in nature, such as the Eighth Amendment's han on "cruel and unusual
punishment," the Ninth Amendment's protection of rights "retained hy the people," or
the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause. See Amar, supra note 30,
at 1762---63.
32. See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 3X (201 0).
33. See J. HARVIE WILKINSON Ill, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY
AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE 22 (2012);
Strauss, supra note 31, at XY3; Primus, Double-Consciousness, supra note 2Y, at H; Cass R.
Sunstcin, Second Amendment Minima/ism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246,
267 (200X).
34. Ackerman warns against this danger in his account of "normal politics."

Ackerman's theory is a response to two related insights in The Federalist. First, and most
importantly, "the ultimate authority" in the American constitutional system "resides in the
people alone." THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 315 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke cd.,
I %1 ). Second, "I tlhc rcprcscnlalivcs of the people ... seem sometimes to fancy that they
arc the people themselves." THE FEDERALIST No. 71, al 4X3-X4 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Jacoh E. Cooke cd., 1%1). With these insights in mind, Ackerman's system is an attempt
to distinguish between decisions made "hy the American people" (in Limes of "higher
lawmaking") and those made "hy their government" (in times of "normal lawmaking").
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Ackerman's demanding rule of recognition guards against this
danger. If the committed popular constitutionalist wishes to craft
a more lenient rule, she must develop similar safeguards.
B. JUDICIAL POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM: REJECTING THE
EASY ANSWERS

As a starting point, the committed popular constitutionalist
should reject two possible approaches-simple judicial restraint
and traditional living constitutionalism.
1. Judicial Popular Constitutionalism Isn't Judicial Restraint
In its simplest form, judicial popular constitutionalism could
call upon judges to defer to the elected branches when resolving
constitutional questions, therefore channeling constitutional
deliberation back towards democratic politics. 35 And, indeed,
36
some scholars have suggested as much. Of course, this approach
has a deep historical pedigree, linking back to legal giants like
James Bradley Thayer and Felix Frankfurter. 37 This alone may
make it appealing to some. Nevertheless, if the central goal of
popular constitutionalism is to promote popular sovereignty,
judicial restraint simply won't do.
Ackerman was onto this issue decades ago. Indeed, his entire
theory of dualist democracy is aimed at addressing the famed
countermajoritarian difficulty. And in typical fashion, Ackerman
turns this alleged difficulty on its head. Rather than viewing
judicial review as a "deviant institution in the American
democracy," ~ Ackerman presents it as an important agent of
39
popular sovereignty.
Recent scholarship reinforces these
insights, confirming both the democratic shortcomings of our
elected branches and the democratic promise of judicial review.
Many factors make it difficult for the President and Congress
to secure transformative legislation that matches majoritarian
3

ACKERMAN, FouNDATIONS, supra note 3, at 6. For Ackerman, "during normal politics,
the People simply do not exist."' /d. at 263. And, on certain occasions, judges arc called
upon to check the actions of elected officials acting without a genuine popular mandate.
35. See Snyder, supra note K, at 350.
36. See, e.g., Snyder, supra note K, at 347-50; Brad Snyder, The Former Clerks Who
Nearly Killed Judicial Restraint, K9 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2129,2151-52 (2014).
37. See Timothy P. O'Neill, Harlan on My Mind: Chief Justice Roberts and the
Affordable Care Act, 3 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 170, 172-73 (2012);; Snyder, supra note K, at 345,
367; Snyder, supra note 36, at 2130, 2133.
3K. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 1K (1962).
39. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 3, at 6, 17, 192, 2K9.
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preferences. These factors include our divided system of
government, our hyperpolarized parties, the committee system,
the filibuster, special-interest groups, and the insulation of
incumbents. 40 The end result is a political system that's often
dominated by partisan pandering, with insulated incumbents
courting base voters who are largely out of step with the wider
public's views, and legislative gridlock, with our major parties
41
unwilling to compromise on proposals, both big and small. At
the same time, an avalanche of recent scholarship confirms that
judicial review- though driven by unelected judges- often
promotes majoritarian preferences, with constitutional doctrine
42
often tracking public opinion, especially on high-salience issues.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Windsor
is a prime example, with the Court enforcing majoritarian
preferences and effectively repealing an unpopular law, above
and beyond the contrary wishes of many Members of Congress.
Of course, there are influential scholars associated with
popular constitutionalism (like Mark Tushnet and Jeremy
Waldron) who want to take the Constitution out of the courts
43
altogether. For these pioneering scholars, any form of judicial
popular constitutionalism beyond simple judicial restraint is an
obvious non-starter. However, even radical court skeptics like
Larry Kramer reserve a key role for the courts in a robust system
of popular constitutionalism. And this should come as no surprise.
Consistent with Kramer's account, popular constitutionalism
is committed, not to an anti-court outlook, but instead to giving
life to the considered views of the American people- full stop.
Sometimes this will happen through the political process.
However, other times the best vehicle for translating these views
into concrete constitutional action is the judiciary.

40.
Review,
41.
42.

See Hasen, supra note 2l), at l)lJ2-lJ3; Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside-Down Judicial
101 GEO. L.J. 113, 15, 14X-52 (2012).
See Hasen, supra note 2l), at l)lJ2-lJ3; Lain, supra note 40, at 152-53.
See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF TilE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION

HAS INFLUENCED TI IE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE
CONSTITUTION (200l)); Lain, supra note 40.

43. See MARK TUSIINET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM TilE COURTS
(2000); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346
(2006).
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2. Judicial Popular Constitutionalism Isn't Living
Constitutionalism
There's no
use
denying that judicial
popular
constitutionalism bears a resemblance to living constitutionalism.
Both theories argue that contemporary values should influence
constitutional meaning, and both rely upon judges to help realize
this goal. Nevertheless, judicial popular constitutionalism isn't
simply living constitutionalism with a flashy new label. To see
why, let's turn first to the traditional account of living
constitutionalism.
Living constitutionalists are a methodologically eclectic
bunch, relying upon all of the traditional modalities of
constitutional interpretation (e.g., text, history, structure,
44
doctrine, and prudence), as well as each interpreter's own sense
of fairness and good social policy, to ensure that the Constitution
"keep[s] in touch with contemporary values" 45 and "adapts to
46
changing times and conditions." The living constitutionalist's
ultimate goal is to "update and affirm" the meaning of the
Constitution's text in a way that presents a normatively attractive
vision for this generation of Americans. 47
Because of this amorphous goal and the theory's
methodological flexibility, critics have long attacked living
constitutionalism as barely a theory at all, describing it as more of
a loose metaphor, licensing judges to read their own views into
the Constitution. 4x While this criticism may fairly apply to certain
accounts of living constitutionalism, theorists like David Strauss
have managed to develop sophisticated versions of the theory that
conform with current judicial practice and, in turn, constrain
49
judicial discretion. However, even in Strauss's famous account
of common law constitutional interpretation, judges-with their
44. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433,437 (1l)X6); Ethan J. Lcih, The Perpetual Anxiety of
Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 353, 35X (2007).
45. Rohcrt Post & Rcva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right's ljving
Constitution, 75 FORDHAM. L. REV. 545, 56l) (2006).
46. BALKIN, supra note 26, at 277.
47. Lcih, supra note 44, at 35l).
4K See Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1755
(2007) !hereinafter Ackerman, Living!; BALKIN, supra note 26, at 277; William H.
Rchnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 6l)3. 6l)3 (1l)76 );
WILKINSON, supra note 33, at 11.
4l). See David A. Strauss, Common l~aw Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. X77 (1l)%) Ihereinafter Strauss, Constitutional Interpretation I; STRAUSS, supra note
32; David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV.
1457 (2001).
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reliance upon judicial precedent, legal craft, and sound
judgment-still take center stage. And, importantly, when onpoint precedent fails to settle a given constitutional dispute
(which is often the case), it's the judge who ultimately "decide[s]
what to do," "often ... on the basis of her views about which
decision will be more fair or is more in keeping with good social
policy. " 50 This is a defensible constitutional vision. However, it's
not judicial popular constitutionalism.
Rather than following her own constitutional wisdom, the
popular constitutionalist judge must commit herself to the
difficult task of identifying the public's considered views
whenever possible and translating them into constitutional
doctrine. 51 This approach constrains judges by actually forcing
them to ground their analyses in concrete indicators of public
opinion 52 -not vague impressions of the "evolving''' constitutional
understandings of the American people or an individual judge's
own sense of fairness and sound policy. In other words, judicial
popular constitutionalism -like Ackermanian constitutional
interpretation- offers the possibility of a genuinely principled,
constrained form of living constitutionalism.
C. MAKING JUDICIAL POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM WORK:
IDENTIFYING WHEN THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE SPOKEN

Contrary to a strong form of Thayerian judicial restraint, the
popular constitutionalist judge may exercise judicial review to
help realize the constitutional views of the American people. And
contrary to the traditional account of living constitutionalism, she
must actually seek out those views by identifying objective indicia
of public opinion. For the committed popular constitutionalist,
the key question is always whether the American people have
reached a considered judgment about a given constitutional issue.
During periods of heightened constitutional engagement- in
other words, periods like Ackerman's constitutional momentsthis question is relatively easy to answer, and for precisely the
reasons Ackerman states. However, at other tirnes, a popular
constitutionalist judge may be inclined to look beyond the
traditional patterns of constitutional change that Ackerman
outlines and, in turn, recognize other examples of public
constitutional consensus. The challenge for the popular
50.
51.

52.

STRAUSS, supra note 32, at 3X.
See Ackerman, Uving, supra note 4X, at 1755.
!d. at I XOI.
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constitutionalist scholar is to be able to provide that judge with
the methodological tools necessary to identify when the American
people have reached a considered judgment-tools that are, at
once, more flexible than Ackerman's rule of recognition, yet still
stringent enough to avoid mere judicial policy-making. This is no
easy task. 53
In this Section, I catalogue various indicators of public
opinion available to the committed popular constitutionalist,
drawing upon insights from Ackerman's new volume throughout.
These are the building blocks of powerful popular constitutional
arguments, available alone or in combination to help judges
determine whether the American people have reached a
considered judgment about a given constitutional issue. All told,
the popular constitutionalist judge may probe at least five distinct
indicators of public opinion.
First, she may look to a variety of actions and activities
54
associated with the President (p. 69). Echoing Ackerman's
account, she may consider a President's claim to a popular
mandate following a critical election (p. 223). She may study a
President's use of the bully pulpit to advance his constitutional
vision (p. 7). And, most importantly, she may analyze any
concrete actions taken by the President to make that vision a
reality, including any coordination with Congress on key
100), any argu~ents ~dvanced by the ~r~side~t's
legislation
legal team, .. and any supportive actions taken by adm1mstrat1ve
56
agencies (pp. 69, 106).
Concededly, when considered in isolation, these factors may
say relatively little about the constitutional views of the wider
public. Indeed, a President's electoral victory, as well as his
various words and deeds while in office, may simply reflect the
constitutional vision-or even bare policy preferences-of a
single political party. However, when considered in tandem with
other elements of the constitutional regime, these presidential

ff·

53. See Lain, supra note 40, at 117, 11 ~; Snyder, supra note ~' at 373; Strauss,
Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 49, at 929.
54. See also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOliN FEREJOIIN, A REPUBLIC OF
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 16 (2010); Jedediah Purdy, Presidential
Popular Constitutionalism, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1~37, 1~37-40 (2009).
55. See, e.g., Snyder, supra note ~' at 3~3, 416 (detailing the Eisenhower
Administration's support for the NAACP in the Brown litigation).
56. See also ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 54, at 16 (noting the importance of
administrative constitutionalism).
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indicators may serve as a sturdy foundation for a broad,
7
compelling popular constitutional argument. 5
Second, a popular constitutionalist judge naay look to a
variety of actions and activities associated with Congress (pp. 89). sH She may scrutinize a congressional party's claim to an
electoral mandate following a wave election. slJ She may examine
60
the text and principles embodied in landmark statutes (p. 100).
61
She may look for any larger r,atterns in congressionallawmaking
(pp. 150-151) and practice. 6 She may study the legislative history
leading to the enactment of key statutes, including notable
63
speeches delivered by congressional leaders (pp. 150-51). And
she may consider the legal arguments advanced by key Members
of Congress in court, including in amicus briefs filed in important
64
constitutional cases.
Once again, these factors-considered in isolation-may do
little to aid the popular constitutionalist judge. Congressional
elections rarely capture the public's attention, and congressional
leaders rarely build a following that extends far beyond their own
57. Ackerman provides a great example in his analysis of Justice William Johnson's
landmark decision in United States v. Hudson & Goodwin. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE
FAILURE OF THE FOUNDINCi FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MJ\RSIIJ\LL, AND THE RISE OF
PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 224-40 (2005). There, the Jeffcrson··appointcd Johnson
declared common-law crimes unconstitutional hascd, in part, on ·'settled . . . puhlic
opinion," Hudson & Uoodwin, 11 lJ .S. 32, 32 (1 H12)- "settled" presumahly hy a series of
Jeffersonian electoral victories that allowed Johnson to write key Jeffersonian principles
into early constitutional doctrine.
5K See also ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 54, at 16; Amar, supra note 30, at
1752; Rohcrt C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943,
19H5-H6 (2003) !hereinafter Post & Siegel, Policentricj; Rohcrt C. Po:~t & Rcva B. Siegel,

Protecting the Constitution from the People: 1 uricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power,
7H IND. L.J. 1, 2 (2003) jhcrcinalkr Post & Siegel, Juricentricj.
59. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 10, at 160-207 (examining
the Repuhlican Party's mandate after the congressional elections of 1:~66 ).
60. See also Rohcrt C. Post. Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture,
Courts, and I.aw, 117 HJ\RV. L. REV. 4, 41 (2003) (examining various landmark statutes
along similar lines); Post & Siegel, Juricentric, supra note 5H, at 2, 14, 30-34 (same). C).
Katzcnhach v. Morgan, 3H4 U.S. 641, 654-56 (1966) (applying an an(:Jiysis that resemhlcs
this approach).
61. See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 6H7-HH (1973) (examining the
flurry of statutes passed in the 1960s and 1970s addressing gender discrimination); Post &
Siegel, Juricentric, supra note 5H, at 32.
62. See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, No. 12-696, slip op. at 10 (U.S. May 5,
2014) (using Congress's longstanding usc of legislative prayer to justify the practice's
constitutionality at the locallcvcl).
63. Cf South Carolina v. Kdtzenhach, 3H3 U.S. 301, 30X-09, 315 (1966) (relying upon
legislative history as part of a larger constitutional argument).
64. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 7H9 (2010) (relying, in part,
on an amicus hricf signed hy Memhers of Congress to support an individual rights reading
of the Second Amendment).
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constituents. Furthermore, as a multimember, multi-chamber
body, Congress rarely takes actions that advance a unitary
constitutional vision. Nevertheless, these congressional indicators
may still serve as key elements in broader popular constitutional
arguments. Indeed, congressional constitutional arguments are
perhaps most compelling when they help to show that the House,
the Senate, and the President have all united behind a single
constitutional vision (pp. 99-116, 149-151 ).
Third, the popular constitutionalist judge may study the
contours of public debates over high-salience constitutional issues
and search for any evidence of constitutional convergence. This is
a key theme of Reva Siegel's scholarship,h6 as well as an important
component of Ackerman's rule of recognition (p. 6).
Nevertheless, it requires a bit of explanation.
Constitutional issues that draw genuine public interest (like
marriage equality, abortion, and gun rights) often inspire largescale social movement activism, as well as mobilization by major
political parties. Predictably, these issues often split us along both
ideological and partisan lines, with increased activities on one side
of a debate frequently leading to backlash by opposing activists. 67
Social movement conflict often deepens the divisions between the
opposing sides; however, that's not all that it does-and this is
Siegel's key insight. These patterns of mobilization and backlash
often also spur widespread public deliberation- deliberation that
extends beyond the activist community and engages the general
public. To win this broader debate, each side must then come to
terms with its opponents' strongest arguments, often co-opting
parts of them in an attempt to stake out a position that appeals to
the wider public. 6H Over time, this dynamic may lead the two sides
69
to converge over certain constitutional baselines. For the
popular constitutionalist judge, this convergence may signal broad
h)

65. Ackerman provides valuahlc models in his rewrites of Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1%4), and Harper v. Virginia Board of Flections, 3X3
U.S. 663 (1%6), in his new volume.
66. See Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in
Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (200X) [hereinafter Siegel, Dead or Alive[; Reva B. Siegel,
Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 lJ.
PA. L. REV. 297 (20()1) [hereinafter Siegel, Text in Contest[.
67. See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict, and
Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1362--63
(2006 ).
6X. !d. at 1330-31.
69. Siegel, Dead or Alive, supra note 66, at 193-94 ( descrihing the constitutional
convergence hetween feminists and social conservatives on a gender equality reading of
the Equal Protection Clause in the 1970s).
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public consensus- a consensus that's worthy of codification in
70
constitutional doctrine.
Of course, constitutional convergence isn't the only pattern
of interest to the popular constitutionalist judge. For instance,
while studying the dynamics around a certain conflict, she may
discover evidence of key defections from one side's coalition,
possibly signaling a crumbling consensus on one side of the
debate. 71 Alternatively, she may find evidence of large-sale
acquiescence by one of our major political parties-- or, at least, by
a critical mass of its mainstream leaders- therefore signaling a
certain issue's demise as a flashpoint of large-scale constitutional
72
conflict between our major parties. Regardless, by tending to the
contours of these public debates (including any evidence of social
movement activism, political mobilization, and public
deliberation), the popular constitutionalist judge may gain key
insights about both the breadth and depth of public support for a
given constitutional position- key elements of any successful
popular constitutional argument. 73
Fourth, the popular constitutionalist judge may look to
74
actions and activities taken at the state and local level. This is
already a well-established part of current judicial practice and,
therefore, requires relatively little explanation. 75 For instance, the
popular constitutionalist judge may examine the rights enshrined

70. We sec examples of such convergence during the struggle over women's rights in
the 1970s and the hattie over gun rights in the 2000s. See Rcva B. Siegel, Heller &
Originalism's Dead /Iand-In Theory and Practice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1414 (2009);
Siegel, Text in Contest, supra note 66, at 30X-13. In hoth of these instances, the Supreme
Court codified the areas of constitutional convergence in landmark decisions. See Siegel,
supra note 70, at 1414; Siegel, supra note 67, at 1331,1406.
71. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 55X, 576 (2003) (using "suhstantial and
continuing" criticism of Bowers hy notahlc conservatives like Charles Fried and Richard
Posner to gesture towards a growing hipartisan consensus against laws criminalizing samesex sodomy). Similarly, a popular constitutionalist judge could look at conservative
defections on marriage equality, including cstahlishmcnt Rcpuhlicans like Jon Huntsman
and Ted Olsen.
72. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, TRANSf<'ORMATIONS, supra note 10, at355-X2 (explaining
how the post-New Deal Rcpuhlican Party came to terms with the constitutionality of the
New Deal usc of federal power).
73. See Ackerman, De-Schooling, supra note 13, at 3110.
74. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S lJNWRI'ITEN CONSTITUTION: THE
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 97 (2012).
75. See, e.g., Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of "F:volving Standards,"
57 UCLA L. REV. 365, 367-6X, 375--405 (2009) (noting that the analysis of state-level action
is used not only in the Eighth Amendment and suhstantivc due process contexts, hut also
on a range of other issues, including procedural due process, equal protection, religious
lihcrty, free speech, Fourth Amendment "reasonahlcncss," and takings).
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76

in state constitutions,
state and local participation in
77
constitutional litigation, the enforcement (or non-enforcement)
patterns of state and local law enforcement, 7il and the everyda~
practices of ordinary Americans and their key institutions. 9
Furthermore, and most familiar of all, she may look to any related
state laws on the books, using the widely accepted method of
state-legislation-counting to support a given construction of a
vague piece of constitutional text (e.g., "cruel and unusual
punishment"),ilo recognize a new unenumerated right as
fundamental (e.g., the right to privacy),il 1 or incorporate a
provision of the Bill of Rights against the states (e.g., the Second
Amendment).il2
Of course, state legislation is often a poor proxy for public
opinion- for instance, when old, unrepresentative laws sit on the
books or when public opinion is changing rapidly.il3 Nevertheless,
a state legislation count may serve as a useful component of a

76. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742,769 (2010) (relying, in part,
on state constitutional provisions to incorporate the Second Amendment against the
states); Steven G. Calahresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions
When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Rat~fied in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in
American History and Tradition?, 't/.7 TEX. L. REV. 7 (200X); Joshua A Douglas, The Right
to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. X9 (2014); Barry Friedman & Sara
Solow, The Federal Right to an Adequate Education, Xl GEO. WASH. L. REV. 92 (2013).
77. See, e.g., McDonald, 561 U.S. at 7'tl.9 (2010) (relying, in part, on an amicus "hricf
submitted hy 3X States" to incorporate the Second Amendment against the states); Joseph
Blocher, Popular Constitutionalism and the State Attorneys General, 122 HARV. L. REV. F.
lOX, lOX (2011).
7K See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 55X, 569-70, 573 (2003) (relying, in part, on
state and local non-enforcement of sodomy laws to strike down a Texas law criminalizing
same-sex sodomy).
79. See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1X11, lXlX-20 (2014) (looking
to the practice of legislative prayer in state legislatures to uphold the practice at a local
town hoard meeting); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 42X, 443 (2000) (upholding
Miranda hased, in part, on the fact that the decision "has hecome emhedded in routine
police practice to the point where the warnings have hecome part of our national culture");
Amar, supra note 30, at 1750, 1755 (noting that the right to counsel for all felony
defendants "was already settled practice in every federal court and in forty-five of the
states" hcfore Gideon).
XO. See, e.g., Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 19X6, 1996--9X (2014); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304,307,310-17 (2002); see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473,2497 (2014) (Ali to,
J., concurring) (noting that the "reasonableness" of a warrantless search of an arrestee's
cell phone under the Fourth Amendment may he informed hy legislation passed hy state
legislatures).
Xl. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 570--73 (striking down a Texas law criminalizing
same-sex sodomy); Washington v. Glucksherg, 521 U.S. 702, 719, 723 (1997) (rejecting a
constitutional right to die). The Ninth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment's
Privileges or Immunities Clause may authorize such an inquiry. Amar, supra note 30, at
1762--63.
X2. See Lain, supra note 75, at 367-6X, 375--405.
X3. !d. at 404; Lain, supra note 40, at 173.
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broader popular constitutional argument- as may state
constitutional consensus, widespread state and local involvement
in constitutional litigation, clear patterns in state and local law
enforcement, and well-settled practices by ordinary citizens and
their key institutions.
Fifth, the popular constitutionalist judge allso has at her
disposal a quantitative means of approximating when the
American public has reached a constitutional consensus-the
public opinion poll. x4 Recent polls may offer her a snapshot of
public opinion at a given moment. And tracking polls may provide
her with a sense of the public's views over time. Both pieces of
information may be valuable when assessing the breadth and
depth of the public's views on a given issue. Nevertheless, the
popular constitutionalist judge should approach public opinion
data with the appropriate level of caution.
For instance, she should be skeptical of a single snapshot
offered by a single poll on a given issue. xs Furthermore, she should
remain attentive to concerns about polling methodology like
poorly worded questions.x6 Finally, even a properly constructed
(and administered) poll leaves open certain questions about
whether the survey results represent the considered judgments of
the American people or just a shallow snapshot of public
opinion.x7 However, the popular constitutionalist judge shouldn't
ignore consistent results in several polls showing public consensus
on a given issue.xx Those consensus views-especially when
sustained over a period of time and reinforced by other evidence
of public engagement- should be a part of her decisionmaking
calculus. x<J
In the end, no single indicator of public opinion is perfect.
However, collectively, the indicators outlined in this Section are
intended to help the popular constitutionalist judge determine
when the American people have reached a considered judgment
about a given constitutional issue. Furthermore, even for a judge
X4. To date, the Supreme Court's lengthiest discussion of puhlic opinion polling was
in Atkins, 536 U.S. 304.
X5. See Strauss, supra note 31, at X63.
X6. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY 7 (2004);
Lain, supra note 40, at 117, 11X; Benjamin J. Roesch, Crowd Control: The Majoritarian
Court and the Reflection of Public Opinion in Doctrine, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 379, 420
(2006).
X7. See Roesch, supra note X6, at 404.
XR Cf Primus, supra note 15, at 1227 (arguing that "stahlc puhlic consensus, not
shifting majority preference," may guide constitutional decisionmaking).
X9. See Lain, supra note 40, at 121, 135.
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who isn't a full-blooded popular constitutionalist, these indicators
may help supplement the traditional tools of constitutional
analysis or, alternatively, provide a fresh way of thinking about
the analytical tools that she's already using. 90
III. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: A QUICK LOOK AT
MARRIAGE EQUALITY
Popular constitutionalists seeking to construct powerful
popular constitutional arguments will draw upon several
indicators of public opinion and take full account of the various
contours of the current constitutional regime (p. 2).l) 1 This type of
analysis will help not only to identify the considered judgments of
the American people, but also to assess their depth and stability.
To see how this approach might work, I conclude by turning to
the issue of marriage equality. In particular, I contrast
Ackerman's treatment of this issue with a plausible application of
judicial popular constitutionalism. While both approaches seek to
keep faith with principles endorsed by the American people, their
respective reference points differ, as do the roles that they each
reserve for individual judges.
For Ackerman, the issue of marriage equality calls for an
application of Brown's anti-humiliation principle (pp. 307-310).
While judges initially limit the reach of a new constitutional
revolution to its core applications- for instance, in the case of
Brown and the Civil Rights Revolution, the anti-humiliation
principle to the question of race in our public schools- it is up to
future judges to extend each revolution's core principles to new
factual contexts, moving from (what Ackerman calls)
particularistic synthesis to comprehensive synthesis.l)2
For instance, consider a legal challenge to a state's same-sex
marriage ban. In this context, it's up to the Ackermanian judge to
apply her own independent judgment- her own "situationsense"- to this new set of facts and determine whether the state
ban violates Brown's anti-humiliation principle (pp. 131-132, 308).
If the answer is yes, then the ban must fall. If the answer is no,
then it may stand. In short, the answer lies in principles endorsed
90. See, e.g., Shdhy County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2o12, 2o32-2o52 (2013) (Ginshurg,
J., dissenting) (using a story of sustained, hipartisan consensus to critique Chid Justice
Rohcrts's majority opinion striking down a key component of the Voting Rights Act).
91. For good examples of this type of analysis, sec Rosen & Schmidt, supra note H, at
129-31; Snyder, supra note X, at 410---17; Lain, supra note 40, at 121-25; Sunstcin, supra
note 33, at 2oo-71.
92. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 3, at Y4--9X.
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by the American people decades ago and a twenty-first century
judge's common-sense application of those principles to new
contexts (p. 308).
To be clear, I don't want to exaggerate either the magnitude
of the dead-hand problem or the amount of judicial discretion
permitted in Ackerman's account. While the anti-humiliation
principle is a product of the 1950s and 1960s, each judge's
situation-sense-the very engine of comprehensive synthesiswill be shaped by today's societal attitudes (pp. 131-132, 308).
Furthermore, each judge is tasked with uncovering the original
understanding of each constitutional revolution and applying its
principles-not each judge's own preferred principles (p. 329).
Therefore, in Ackerman's account, old principles are mediated by
contemporary values, and each judge's policy preferences are
tempered by well-established constitutional principles.
Nevertheless, for Ackerman, the answer does ultimately lay in
each judge's independent conclusion- her own attempt to keep
faith with the constitutional tradition -not that judge's
assessment of contemporary public opinion. This is, of course, in
contrast with judicial popular constitutionalism.
For the popular constitutionalist judge, conternporary public
opinion is a key (and explicit) part of her decisionmaking calculus,
as she seeks to use the various tools at her disposal to reach a
textured understanding of the public's views on a given issue. Of
course, she will turn first to the text, history, and principles
enshrined in the Constitution. However, if she determines that
those sources are inconclusive, she will then seek to understand
the contours of public opinion. When analyzing the issue of
marriage equality, the popular constitutionalist judge might begin
by noting that this issue has been the topic of sustained public
debate for over a decade-in elections, in the hal1s of Congress,
in state and local legislative bodies, and at various kitchen tables,
water coolers, and neighborhood barbecues throughout the
nation. Therefore, any public views on marriage equalitywhether offered by public figures or evident in public opinion
polls-are likely to represent well thought-out positions rather
than unreflective snapshots.
From there, the popular constitutionalist judge might then
work her way through the various indicators of public opinion.
For instance, she might first turn to public opinion polls to assess
the public's current views on the issue, as well as to note any
related trends. If so, she will have a number of polls from which
to draw, as marriage equality has been the subject of endless
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polling since the issue was first placed on the public agenda over
a decade ago. She might then turn to any actions and activities
associated with the President, including President Obama's public
endorsement of marriage equality before the 2012 election, the
Department of Justice's refusal to defend the federal Defense of
Marriage Act in court, its participation in Obergefell v. Hodges
this Term, and any actions taken by administrative agencies to
promote LGBT rights. She might then examine any related
legislation at the federal, state, and local level, cataloguing any
state and local laws on the books and noting any patterns (or lack
thereof) in congressional lawmaking. She might also examine the
litigation decisions made by state attorneys general, as well as
federal, state, and local lawmakers, in various marriage-equality
cases. Finally, she might look for any evidence of bipartisan, crossideological support for (or opposition to) marriage equality.
Of course, different popular constitutionalists may reach
different conclusions based on these indicators. For instance,
some popular constitutionalists may choose to strike down samesex marriage bans, leaning heavily on evidence of majority
support for marriage equality and a clear trend continuing in that
direction. Others may reach the same conclusion, but instead
emphasize the crumbling consensus against marriage equality,
with former marriage-equality opponents- including leading
Democratic politicians (like President Obama) and establishment
Republicans (like Jon Huntsman)-now expressing support for
the idea, and public opinion polls showing a diminishing minority
opposing it. When there was a strong consensus against marriage
equality, these popular constitutionalists may have been inclined
to uphold laws prohibiting same-sex marriage. However, now that
such a consensus has dissolved, they may feel freer to use the
trend in favor of marriage equality and other tools of
93
constitutional analysis to strike down same-sex marriage bans.
Of course, other popular constitutionalists may look at the
same indicators and conclude that marriage equality is still an area
of ongoing conflict where neither side has secured a sustained
constitutional consensus. Therefore, at least for now, they may be
inclined to defer to the elected branches and permit a variety of
approaches to marriage in the states. Finally, still others may view
constitutional equality as an area (like free speech) that should
fall outside of the domain of popular constitutional analysis
altogether and, therefore, decide to apply other methods to the
93.

See Primus, supra note 15, at 122H.
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issue. Regardless of the conclusion drawn by any individual
interpreter, the indicators of public opinion outlined here provide
the popular constitutionalist judge with the methodological tools
necessary to analyze important constitutional issues.
CONCLUSION
Bruce Ackerman's We the People: The Civil Rights
Revolution is a rich, textured, engrossing account of one of the
most important periods in American history. However, it's also a
call to action for lawyers to finally place the American peopleand not just the Supreme Court and our mythical Founders-at
the center of our constitutional story.
Answering Ackerman's call, I've used this review of his new
volume to offer a preliminary account of judicial popular
constitutionalism. While a detailed description of this approach is
beyond the scope of this Book Review, I hope that this account is
of some use to those interested 1n making popular
constitutionalism work.

